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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
COUNTY OF COLUMBIA 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------X 




NEW YORK Sf ATE DEPARTMENT OF . 
CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, 
BRIAN FISCHER, Commissioner of New York State 
Department of Corrections and Community 
Supervision, Department of Corrections and 
Community Supervision, NEW YORK BOARD OF 
PAROLE, ANDREA W. EVANS, Chairwoman of the 
New York Board of Parole, 
Respondents. 
For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the 
Civil Practice Law and Rules 
------------------------------------------------------------------x 
P.roceeding Return Date: March 29, 2013 
APPEARANCES: 
Petitioner: Orlee Goldfeld, Esq. 
Hollyer Brady, LLP 
DECISION /ORDER 
Index No. 5696-13 
R.J.I. No.10-13-0112 
Richard Mott, J.S.C. 
60 East 4znd Street, Suite 1825 
New York, NY 10165 
Respondents: Eric T. Schneiderman, Esq. 
Attorney General of the State of New York 
The Capitol 
Albany, NY 12224-0341 
Brian J. O'Donnell, Esq. Assistant Attorney General, of Counscl 
Mott, J. 
Petitioner filed this Article 78 proceeding to challenge Respondents' August 21, 
2012, decision denying him release on parole. 
Petitioner, age 59, is serving a 11/3 to 4 year sentence1• He was convicted in New 
York County on February 17, 2011. At or about the time of his sentencing, Petitioner made 
full restitution in the amountof$19 million, was stripped of his licenses and barred from 
participating in the securities industry, and faced automatic disbarment by virtue of his 
conviction. The Department of Probation recommended that Petitioner be sentenced to a 
term of probation; the prosecution requested an unspecified term of in~arceration: The 
sentencing Court found that "it is not likely that Morris will 'do it again' in the future." 
Petitioner was presumptively eligible for parole on June 18, 2012 (see, Correction 
Law §805), and when he met the Parole Board on August 21, 2012, he already had served 
25 months2, far in excess of the 12-to-18 month guideline, as confirmed in his Inmate Status 
Report. He had no disciplinary infractions, and a COMPAS evaluation determined he had 
the lowest possible risk to recidivate. Nevertheless, he was denied parole. The panel stated: 
Denied 9 months. Next appearance, November, 2012. 
Parole denied. 
After a personal interview, record review, and deliberation, 
this panel finds your release is incompatible with the public 
safety and welfare. Required statutory factors have been 
1Petitionerwas convicted of a single count of violation of New York General 
Business Law §352-c(6), the Martin Act, a class E felony, which related to his work as a 
licensed, registered placement agent 
2He served most of his sentence in protective custody. 
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considered, including your risk to the community, 
rehabilitation efforts, and your needs for successful community 
reintegration. 
Your instant offense involved a guilty plea to General Business 
Law Section 352-c(6), wherein you engaged in a systematic 
series of fraudulent stock market-related transaction. Your 
course of conduct over a period of multiple years show a 
disregard for your ethical responsibilities as a licensed security 
broker and attorney. 
Consideration has been given to your receipt of an Earned 
Eligibility Certificate, good behavior, program 
accomplishments (as able), and document submissions. 
Due to your actions over a·period of time and deceitful nature 
of those activities which placed the integrity of the New York 
State Common Retirement Fund at risk, your release at this 
time Is denied. There is a reasonable probability you would not 
live and rem al n at liberty without violating the law. 
It is well settled that release on parole is a discretionary function of the Parole 
Board and that its determination will not be disturbed by the Court unless it is shown that 
the Board's decision is irrational "bordering on impropriety" and that the determination 
was, thus, arbitrary and capricious. Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 4 70 (2000); 
Matter of King v. NYS Division of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423 (l't Dept 1993), affd 83 N.Y.2d 788 
(1994). In reviewing the B.o.ard's decision, the Court must also examine whether the 
Board's discretion was properly exercised in accordance with the parole statute. Matter of 
Thwaites v. New York State Board of Parole, 34 Misc.3d 694 (2011). 
Executive Law §259-i(2)( c) provides general criteria the Board must consider. And 
the statute provides the Board with specific factors to consider in determining whether the 
general criteria have been met. See, Executive Law §§259·i(2)(c)(A)(i-viii). 
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The 2011 Amendment 
Executive Law §259-c( 4) was amended in 2011 to require the Parole Board to 
promulgate new procedures in making parole release decisions. These required 
procedures "shall incorporate risk and needs principles to measure the rehabilitation of 
persons appearing before the Board, the likelihood of success of such persons upon release, 
and assist members of the state Board of Parole in determining which inmates may be 
released to parole supervision." Id. 
This statutory change sought to modernize the work of the Parole Board by 
requiring the Board to adopt procedures that incorporate social science research in 
assessing post-release and recidivism risks. Matter of Thwaites v. New York State Board of 
Parole, supra, citing Genty, "Changes to Parole Law Signal Potentially Sweeping Policy 
Shift", NYLJ, September 1, 2011. Specifically, the statute replaced "static, past focused 
'guidelines' with more dynamic present and future-focused risk assessment 'procedures."' 
Id., 34 Misc.3d at 699. Moreover, "[t]he Legislature, by enacting an amendment of a statute, 
changing the language thereof, is deemed to have intended a material change in the. law." 
Statutes§ 193. See, Matter of Stein, 131 A.D.2d 68, 71 (2d Dept. 1987). Accordingly, 
Respondents' assertions that the legislative amendment maintained the status quo ante 
must be rejected. 
The Board's Rule Making Function And The Requirement To File 
Before the 2011 amendment, Executive Law §259-c( 4) required the establishment 
of "written guidelines" for use in making parole determinations. The statute did not 
require Respondent to engage in rule making. Accordingly, Respondent adopted 9 NYCRR 
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§8001.J(a), including a grid setting forth sentence guidelines. The guidelines explicitly 
stated that the time ranges in the grid "are merely guidelines, [and m]itigating or 
aggravating factors may result in decisions above or befow the guidelines" (See, Matter of 
Lue-Shing v. Travis, 12 A.D.3d 802, 803-4 (3d Dept 2004)). Thus, the guidelines adopted 
under the old statute were not "regulations" (Id., citing Matter of Alea Indus. V. Delaney, 92 
N.Y.2d 775, 778-9 (1999)), and their validity was not dependent upon filing with the 
Secretary of State. Id., at 804. 
The amended, 2011 version of Executive Law §259-c(4), on the other hand, required 
Respondent to engage in rule making. The amended statute mandated the establishment of 
"written procedures" which, inter alia, "shall incorporate risk and needs principles to_ 
measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board" and "the likelihood of 
success of such persons upon release." By its terms3 the 2011 amendment of Executive 
Law §259-c( 4) mandated the adoption of new rule( s) or regulation(s ), i.e. the adoption of 
"a fixed, general principle to be applied by an administrative agency."" Matter of Lue-Shill{} 
v. Travis, 12 AD.3d at 803, citing Matter of New York Cit;y TransitAuth v. New York State 
Dept of Labor, 88 N.Y.2d 225, 229 (1996) quoting Matter of Roman Catholic Diocese v. New 
York State Dept. Of Health, 66 N.Y.2d 948, 951 (1985). Put simply, the amended statute 
required that Respondent develop written procedures that implement risk and needs 
principles, determine the likelihood of an inmate's success upon release, and adopt those 
procedures as an exercise of its rule making power. 
3Because the amendment of Executive Law §259-c(4) was "nestled into a 2011-2012 
executive budget bill and did not result from a legislative initiative, there was no · · 
justification memo from a sponsoring lawmaker, no approval message from the govemor-
nothing to provide insight into what was intended." Caber, "Effect of Risk Assessment Rule 
On Parole Decisions Is Unclear," NYLJ, April 30, 2012. 
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Respondent misreads the amendment By positing that "where an agency renders 
determinations based on a case-by-case basis analysis of the facts of a particular matter, 
there is no requirement that the guidelines it employs be promulgated as rules or 
regulations (citations omitted)." However, unlike the former Section §259-c(4), the 
amendment does not authorize Respondents to write guidelines which might include 
"interpretive statements and statements of general policy ... [that] are merely explanatory" 
(SAPA §102(2)(b)(iv)). Rather, the amendment requires Respondents to "[e]stablish 
written procedures," i.e. enumerate the materials the Board would use to determine an 
inmate's likelihood of success upon release. 
Notwithstanding the plain language of the amendment, and the requirement that 
such procedures be in effect by October 1, 2011, Respondent inexplicably still has adopted 
no new procedures4• To the contrary, Respondent untenably states, "Executive Law §259-
c( 4) dictates neither how new 'written procedures' are to be established, nor in what 
manner 'risk and needs principles' are to be incorporated within them." O'Donnell 
Affidavit, f 15; Munkwitz Affirmation, if20. Further, Respondent sophistically argues that 
the October 5, ·2011, Memorandum written by Respondent Evans ("The Evans 
Memorandum") "serves as" the statutorily required procedures (O~Donnell Affidavit 117; 
Tracy Affirmation, 1f1f12, 20) even though the Evans Memorandum neither has been 
adopted as a formal rule (see, 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8000.1), nor has it been filed with the Secretary 
of State. See, e.g., Executive Law §259-c(l 1) (requiring filing of rules with the Secretary of 
4An administrative agency's adoption of "procedures" is clearly a subject of the 
agency's rule making power. The adopted procedures must be consistent with enabling 
legislation and as an exercise of rule making, the "procedures" must be promulgated and 
flied with the Secretary of State. See, SAPA §102(2)(a)(i), Executive Law §259c-(11). 
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State), SAPA §§202, 203, Rent Stabilization Assn v. Higgins, 83 N.Y.2d 156, 175 (1993). The 
Court rejects these assertions. 
The Effect Of The Amendment 
Respondents have flip-flopped concerning the affect of this amendment On one 
hand, the October 5, 2011 Evans Memorandum asserted that despite amendment of the 
statute, "[p]lease know that the standard for assessing the appropriateness for. release, as 
well as the stat.utory criteria you must consider has not changed." See, Tracy Affirmation, 
'Tf15. A month later, on November 10, 2011, Respondent Evans testified before a Legislative 
Committee that said procedures had not yet been developed. Goldfeld Affidavit, Exhibit K. 
On April 18, 2012, six months after the effective date of the amendment, Respondent 
stated that written procedures "are currently being developed," undeniably evincing 
Respondents' knowledge that such procedures had be'en mandated. Indeed, when 
Respondent Evans testified before the Legislative Committee on November 10, 2011, she 
stated that Respondents were working on the development of a transitional accountability 
plan5 (TAP) that "will be the instrument that will measure the rehabilitation of persons 
appearing before the Board as well as their likelihood of success in the community when 
5Correction Law 71-a, which became effective on October 1, 2011, required the 
development of a TAP "upon admission of an inmate to ... custody." Respondent Fischer 
testified before a Legislative Committee in November, 2011, that "TAP will go live by July 1, 
(2012] and that "three months [thereafter] everyone will be on it" Goldfeld Affirmation, 
Exhibit K, pp. 47~48. Despite this testimony, in which Respondent acknowledged that TAP 
would apply to every inmate, regardless of date of incarceration, Respondents argue that 
TAP only applies to newly admitted inmates. See, Munkwitz Affirmation, 1]'32. The Court 
rejects that argument. See, Statutes §321 ("Generally, remedial statutes are liberally . 
construed to carry out the reforms intended and to promote justice."), Dewine v. State of NY 
Board of Examiners, 89 A.D.3d 88, 92 (4th Dept. 2011), Crucible Materialsv. New York Power 
Authority, 50 A.D.3d 1353, 1355-6 (3d Dept. 2008). 
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released" (Exhibit K, p. 19). Acknowledging the requirement for written procedures 
(Exhibit K, p. 19), she indicated that TAP and COMPAS would be used after a pilot period 
"when assessing the appropriateness of an inmates release to community supervision." 
Clearly, contrary to Respondents' assertions, the Evans Memorandum itself is not 
and cannot serve as the required procedures. Moreover, the authorities6 relied upon by 
Respondents fail to establish that it has complied with 'the rule making requirements 
imposed by the amendment of Executive Law §259-c(4) in 2011. 
Disregard of a Legislative mandate through an administrative agency's inaction, as 
here, is arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law. See, Mayfield v. Evans, 93 AD.3d 98,. 
107 (1' t Dept 2012), citing People ex rel Sheldon v. Board of Appeals, 234 N.Y. 484, 495 
(1923) ("We must assume that the law-making body intended to effect a material change in 
the existing law, otherwise the legislation would be nugatory.") Here, because no written 
procedures have been promulgated concerning how parole decis ions should be made, the 
Legislative mandate has been ignored. By reason thereof, Petitioner's August 21, 2012 
parole hearing was unlawful. 
Consideration Of Statutory Factors 
The Parole Board is required to consider a number of factors in determining 
whether an inmate should be released on parole. Executive Law §259-i, Matter of Malone v. 
6MatterofGass v. New York State Board of Parole, Index No. 12·13199 (Ulster 
County, 2/ 8/ 13), MatterofOrtizv. Evans, Index No. 3933-12 (Albany County 12/3/ 12), 
Matter of Rodriguez v. New York State Division of Parole, Index No. 3 93 2 (Albany County, 
11/29 / 12), Matter of Melendez v. Evans, Index No. 1973-12 (Sullivan County 9/27 / 12), al1 
of which are not binding on this Court Cf. Matter of Cotto v. Evans, 2013 WL 486508 (St 
Lawrence County 1/22/13), MatterofMercerv. New York State Board of Parole, Index No. 
6330-12 (Albany County, 2/22/13). 
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Evans, 83 A.D.3d 719 (2d Dept 2011) citing Matter of Huntley v. Evans, 77 A.D.3d 945, 947 
(2d Dept 2010) and Matter of Miller v. New York State Division of Parole, 72 A.D.2d 690, 691 
(2d Dept 2010). While the Board need not expressly discuss each of these factors in its 
determination (see, Matter of King v. New York State Division of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788, 790 
(1994)) or afford these factors equal weight (see, Matter of Wan Zhang v.Travis, 10 A.D.3d 
828 (3d Dept 2004)), it is the obligation of the Parole Board to give fair consideration7 to 
each of the statutory factor.s, and where, as here, the record convincingly demonstr.ates that 
the Board in fact failed to consider the proper factors, the Court must intervene. Matter of 
King v. New York Division of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 431 (2d Dept 1993). 
Focusing Exclusively On The Nature Of The Crime 
Here, the Court finds that the Board's decision focused almost, if not exclusively on 
Petitioner's crime. See, pages 2-3, infra. While the seriousness of the crime remains acutely 
relevant in determining whether Petitioner should be released, the record in this case 
demonstrates conclusively that the Board failed to take into account and fairly consider any 
of the other relevant statutory fattors. See, e.g., Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 
476-7 (2000). When, as here, the Parole Board focuses entirely on the nature of Petitioner's 
crime, there is a strong indication that the denial of parole is a foregone conclusion that 
7In testimony before a Legislative Committee, Respondent conceded that generally 
Commissioners have about one half hour to review a case before it is heard, and that 
although files are available the day before a scheduled hearing, some Commissioners 
review the files the morning of the hearing. Goldfeld Affidavit, Exhibit K, pp. 57-59. Here, 
Petitioner's submissions (Exhibit uJ") alone exceed 100 pages. Clearly, in addition to the ' 
other materials required to be reviewed in connection with Petitioner's parole 
determination, it would take the Commissioners far more than one half hour to read and 
evaluate Petitioner's submissions, let alone all of other materials required to be reviewed. 
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does not comport with statutory requirements. See, Matter of Winchell v. Evans, 32 Misc.3d 
117(A), 2011WL2811465 (Sullivan County, 2011) citing Stanley v. New York State Board of 
Parole, 2011 N.Y. Slip Op 21136 (Orange County, 2011J: lndeed, the Board's passing 
mention of Petitioner's ureceipt of an Earned Eligibility Certificate, good behavior, program 
accomplishments (as able), and document submissions" and its conclusory statement that 
"required statutory factors have been considered, including your risk to the community, 
rehabilitation efforts, and your needs for successful community reintegration," were 
woefully inadequate in the circumstances of this case to demonstrate that the Board 
weighed or fairly considered the required statutory factors. See, Matter of Rios v. New York 
State Division of Parole, 836 N.Y.S.2d 503, 2007 WL 846561 (Kings County, 2007) citing 
Matter of King v. New York Division of Parole, 190 A.D.2d at434. 
Specifically, the record demonstrates that the Board inexplicably failed to consider 
and weigh myriad relevant factors, all of which categorically supported Petitioner's release 
on parole. These include, but are not limited to: the fact that the instant crime was 
Petitioner's first and only contact with the law; that the sentencing judge found that he 
would not commit another crime; that he had already served 25 months' imprisonment, far 
in excess of his 12-to· 18 month guideline; that he had an exemplary prison record and no 
disciplinary infractions; that a COMPAS evaluation determined him to have the lowest 
possible risk to recidivate; that he lost all of his licenses, was barred from any work in the 
securities industry, and from all business dealings with the State of New York, rendering a 
subsequent, similar crime impossible; that he was subject to automatic disbarment; he 
achieved a certificate of earned eligibility, making him presumptively eligible for paroJe; his 
defense lawyer strongly supported his parole application; while in prison he assisted other 
·10-
inmates with their education; although he owns his own home, he agreed to reside 
elsewhere in the event the Board deemed it more appropriate; he repeatedly expressed his 
genuine remorse; he made full restitution in the amourit of of $19 miJlion; he had 
employment available to him upon release; upon being released he expressed his desire to 
work for a not-for-profit corporation, to perform volunteer work, and to spend as much 
time as possible with his 90-year old mother; a group of 30 people agreed to assist him 
with. his reintegration into the community, each promising to do so one day per month. 
Despite all of these factors, and the complete absence of any countervailing factors from 
which any risk to the community or that he would reoffend could remotely be inferred, the 
Board astonishingly concluded, NThere is a reasonable probability you would not live and 
remain at liberty without violating the la'w." Such an arbitrary decision can be reached 
solely by ignoring statutorily required factors. See, e.g., Matter of Peckham v. Calogero, 12 
N.Y.3d 424, 431 (2009)("An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without 
sound basis in reason or regard to the facts.») See, e.g., Matter of Wallman v. Travis, 18 
A.D.3d 304 (l't Dept. 2005), Matter of Coaxum v. New York State Board of Parole, 14 Misc3d 
661 (Bronx County, 2006), Matter of Weinstein v. Dennison, 7 Misc.3d 1009(A), 2005 WL 
856006 (New York County, 2005). 
In concluding that Petitioner's release was "Incompatible with public safety and 
welfare" and that if released there was "a reasonable probability that he would not live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law," on this record, the Board's mere recitation of 
the materials it purportedly considered that were favorable to Petitioner, provides no 
assurance whatsoever to this Court that the Board indeed fairly considered such materials, . 
particularly since the only reason articulated therefor was Petitioner's crime. 
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Explanation Of Reasons For Denying Parole 
The Board's decision8 utterly failed to explain it.S'reasoning for denying Petitioner 
parole. Indeed, here, the Board failed to explain, other than the facts of the crime, why 
Petitioner's release was "incompatible with the public safety and welfare" and why there 
was "a reasonable probability (he] would not live and remain at liberty without violating 
. the law.'' As noted in Matter of Flynn v. Travis, Index No. 19168/98 (Westchester County, 
1999)(West, J.), the Board #should be well able to articulate the reasoning" for its decision, 
"if it were come to reasonably, in a non-arbitrary, un-capricious manner." 
Conclusion 
As the Court found in Matter of Cotto v. Evans, 2013 WL 486508, 2013 Slip Op.30222 
(St Lawrence County, 2013), this Court finds that Petitioner's parole denial was not 
rendered in accordance with law and must be overturned: 
[T]his Court finds nothing in the record to suggest that the written 
procedures mandated by the amended version of Executive Law §259-c(4) 
were established, much less implemented and considered in the context of 
determining whether or not petitioner should be released to parole 
supervision. Accordingly, the Court finds that the December 2011 parole 
denial determination was not rendered in accordance with law and must be 
overturned, with the matter remitted to the Board of Parole for de novo 
discretionary parole release consideration. See Thwaites v. New York State 
Board of Parole, 34 Misc3d 694. See also Lichte! v. Travis, 287 A.D.2d 83. 
8The Board is required to inform the inmate in writing of the factors and reasons for 
the denial of parole, and "[s]uch reasons shall be given in detail and not in conclusory 
terms.'' Executive Law 259-i(2)( a). See, Matter of Malone, supra, Matter of Mitchell v. New 
York State Division of Parole, 58 A.D.3d 742 (2d Dept 2009). 
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Moreover, the Court finds that the Board failed to fairly consider and weigh required 
statutory factors in reaching its decision. 
Petitioner already has appeared before the Parole Board five times, and has had 
three parole hearlngs9• Petitioner has filed three administrative appeals and two prior 
Article 78 proceedings raising the same issues as here. His present Conditional Release 
date is October 18, 2013. Time is of the essence in providing Petitioner with the relief 
herein. 
Accordingly, the Board's determination of August 21, 2012, is vacated and the 
matter is remanded to the Board which, on or before April 22, 2013, shall hold a new 
parole hearing consistent with this Decision and Order before a different panel and issue a 
decision thereon within 2 days of the hearing, a copy of which decision shall be provided to 
the Court forthwith. 
This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court. The Court is forwarding the 
· original Decision and Order directly to the Petitioner, who is required to comply with the 
provisions of CPLR §2220 with regard to the filing and entry thereof. A photocopy of the 
Decision and Order is being forwarded to all other parties who appeared in the action. All 
original motion papers are being delivered by the Court to the Surpreme Court Clerk 
for transmission to the County Clerk. 
9Parole hearings have been held on February 21, August 21, and November 14, 
2012. On two occasions, a parole hearing was not conducted, once because the 
commissioners did not have Petitioner's file and once because of recusals. 
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Dated: Claverack, New York 
April 12, 2013 
Documents Considered: 
ENTER 
.. IS/ Richard Mott 
RICHARD MOTT, J.S.C. 
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